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Delaying gratification is hard, yet predictive of important life outcomes, such as academic
achievement and physical health. Prominent theories focus on the role of self-control,
hypersensitivity to immediate rewards, and the cost of time spent waiting. However,
delaying gratification may also require trust in people delivering future rewards as
promised. To test the role of social trust, participants were presented with character
vignettes and faces that varied in trustworthiness, and then choose between hypothetical
smaller immediate or larger delayed rewards from those characters. Across two
experiments, participants were less willing to wait for delayed rewards from less
trustworthy characters, and perceived trustworthiness predicted willingness to delay
gratification. These findings provide the first demonstration of a causal role for social
trust in willingness to delay gratification, independent of other relevant factors, such as
self-control or reward history. Thus, delaying gratification requires choosing not only a
later reward, but a reward that is potentially less likely to be delivered, when there is
doubt about the person promising it. Implications of this work include the need to revise
prominent theories of delay of gratification, and new directions for interventions with
populations characterized by impulsivity.
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INTRODUCTION
Delaying gratification is hard. Many people would rather enjoy
a paycheck now than put money away for later. Everyone some-
times struggles to hold out for delayed rewards, but certain pop-
ulations face particular difficulties, including addicts, criminals,
obese individuals, depressed individuals, adolescents, and chil-
dren (Wulfert et al., 2002; Hongwanishkul et al., 2005; Johnson
et al., 2007; Anokhin et al., 2011; Casey et al., 2011). Moreover,
the ability to delay gratification in childhood predicts important
later life outcomes. For example, the ability to resist a desirable
immediate treat in favor of a larger delayed one during preschool
predicts higher SAT scores and better social competence in ado-
lescence (Mischel et al., 1989; Shoda et al., 1990), and lower
obesity rates and substance abuse in adulthood (Ayduk et al.,
2000; Schlam et al., 2013). The tendency to treat future rewards as
worth less than immediate rewards may therefore lead to undesir-
able consequences, both for the individual (e.g., lack of personal
savings in case of emergency), and for society at large (e.g.,
insufficient long term investments in science and technology).
Prominent explanations of delaying gratification focus on the
role of self-control, hypersensitivity to immediate rewards, and
the cost of time spent waiting (Benzion et al., 1989; McClure
et al., 2004; Zauberman and Lynch, 2005; Figner et al., 2010).
However, delaying gratification also relies on the fundamental
assumption that a future reward will be delivered as promised
(e.g., that a portfolio manager will responsibly manage clients’
savings; Frederick et al., 2002; Kidd et al., 2012; Mischel, 1961).
That is, regardless of self-control, salience of immediate options,
or perceived cost of time spent waiting, delaying gratification
may only make sense when individuals believe that they would
actually receive the delayed reward in the future if they opted
to wait for it. Delaying gratification is not simply about choos-
ing “more later” over “some now,” but rather, requires choosing
“maybe more later” over “some now,” when there is doubt about
whether those promising the future reward would come through.
Thus, delaying gratification may depend upon interpersonal
trust, which refers to an interdependent relationship in which
one party has a social expectation of cooperation from another
party (Robinson, 1996; de Visser andKrueger, 2012). Trust in oth-
ers is dynamically updated through experience (King-Casas et al.,
2005), and can be can be modulated by information about oth-
ers’ prior behavior (Delgado et al., 2005) and perceptions of their
ability to regulate their own behavior (Righetti and Finkenauer,
2011), as well as by motivational and affective states (Dunn and
Schweitzer, 2005; Van den Bos et al., 2011). If delaying gratifica-
tion depends upon expectations about an individual’s likelihood
of cooperation, variations in levels of trust should influence
decisions to delay gratification.
Limited evidence is consistent with a role of social trust in
delaying gratification, but is open to alternative interpretations.
For example, children with fathers absent from the home (who
might therefore be less inclined to trust others) are more likely
to prefer smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed options
(Mischel, 1961). Additionally, individuals who are less coopera-
tive in a trust game also behave more impulsively in a temporal
discounting task (Harris and Madden, 2002). However, such cor-
relations could be driven by other factors, such as self-control, or
by a causal relationship in the reverse direction, such that social
cooperation requires the ability to delay gratification (Harris and
Madden, 2002).
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Some experimental work suggests a causal role of social trust
in delaying gratification, but could alternatively be interpreted
in terms of more general reward effects. For example, when
rewards are promised by an experimenter but never provided,
or are delivered inconsistently, preferences for immediate grat-
ification increase in humans and other animals (Mahrer, 1956;
Stevens et al., 2011; Kidd et al., 2012). This effect could arise
from reduced trust that a delayed reward will be provided, but
might alternatively arise from the changes to subjective well-
being, motivation, and willpower that accompany reward pro-
vision/omission (Gomez and McLaren, 1997) and are known to
influence self-control (Vansteenkiste and Deci, 2003; Ifcher and
Zarghamee, 2011; Pyone and Isen, 2011; Lerner et al., 2013).
That is, participants may have been less able to delay gratification
because rewards that were inconsistent or withheld led to reduced
self-control, rather than to reduced social trust.
The present studies thus test whether social trust, manipulated
in the absence of rewards, influences choices about whether to
delay gratification. We manipulated trust using vignettes about
fictional characters (Experiment 1) and accompanying faces that
varied in perceived trustworthiness (Experiment 2). We then
assessed delay of gratification using a series of intertemporal
choices in which participants were asked if they would prefer a
smaller, immediate reward or a larger, delayed reward from the
character they read about. We tested adults to build on prior
manipulations of trust in the absence of rewards (Delgado et al.,
2005; Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008; Fareri et al., 2012), and to
obtain more precise estimates of willingness to delay.
EXPERIMENT 1
All participants read three vignettes depicting trustworthy,
untrustworthy, and neutral characters, then considered each char-
acter in delay of gratification situations.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Seventy-eight participants (34 male, 39 female, five who preferred
not to indicate gender) between 18 and 64 years of age (Mage =
31.1 years, SD = 11.1 years) were paid $1.00 for completing the
experiment, which lasted 10–15min. Participants were recruited
via Amazon’sMechanical Turk, a website that allows users to com-
plete small tasks for pay, and had an average approval rating of
at least 99% from previous jobs. Participants lived in the United
States, and were normally distributed in terms of socioeconomic
status, with the average participant having completed some col-
lege and receiving a financial income between $37,500–49,999 per
year. All participants were included in the analyses; results were
identical when excluding participants based on null discounting
(i.e., all later responses in at least one condition, N = 2; as in
Kirby and Marakovic´, 1996).
Materials and procedure
The experiment was presented in an online survey format.
Participants first completed demographic questions. Then, as in
Delgado et al. (2005), participants read the vignettes in a fixed
order (trustworthy, untrustworthy, neutral) and completed trust-
worthiness ratings, using a scale of 1–7 to rate each individual
on trustworthiness, likability, approachability, and likelihood of
sharing. Next, participants completed intertemporal choice ques-
tions (as in Kirby and Marakovic´, 1996), which varied in imme-
diate reward values ($15–83), delayed reward values ($30–85),
and length of delays (10–75 days). Each question was modified
to mention an individual from one of the vignettes [e.g., “If
(trustworthy individual) offered you $40 now or $65 in 70 days,
which would you choose?”]. Participants completed 63 questions
in total, with 21 different questions that occurred once with each
vignette, interleaved in a single fixed but random order for all
participants. The 21 choices were classified into 7 ranks (using
the classification system from Kirby and Marakovic´, 1996), where
higher ranks should yield higher likelihood of delaying, allowing
a rough estimation of a subject’s willingness to delay using a small
number of trials. Rewards were hypothetical, given that hypothet-
ical and real rewards elicit equivalent behaviors (Madden et al.,
2003) and brain activity (Bickel et al., 2009), and were preceded
by instructions asking participants to consider each choice as if
they would actually receive the option selected. Participants took
as much time as they needed to complete the procedures.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Trust manipulated in the absence of reward, within subjects,
influenced participants’ willingness to delay gratification, with
perceived trustworthiness predicting willingness to delay.
Approach and preliminary analyses
The effect of condition and rank on choice was analyzed with
generalized linear mixed effect (lmer) models (with a logit link),
using the lme4 package (Bates and Sarkar, 2006) in the R statistics
package (R Development Core Team, 2006). Subjects’ intercepts
were modeled as random effects. This technique is a common
alternative to ANOVA (e.g., Laubrock et al., 2007) and allowed
us to model individual trial data to predict the probability of
choosing the delayed option (“probability of delaying”) without
averaging within individuals or rank. Validating the short tempo-
ral discounting assessment, the probability of delaying increased
with rank, b = 0.81, SE = 0.15, z = 54.12, p < 0.001.
Perceived trustworthiness was predicted by condition
(untrustworthy < neutral < trustworthy), b = 1.41, SE = 0.02,
t = 90.9, p < 0.0001, suggesting our trust manipulation was
effective (Figure 1A). The difference between untrustworthy
and neutral conditions was not significantly different from the
difference between neutral and trustworthy conditions, b = 0.18,
SE = 0.27, t = 0.65, p > 0.51.
Effects of trust on delaying gratification
Participants’ preference for delayed rewards, as indexed by prob-
ability of delaying, was predicted by condition, b = 0.76, SE =
0.04, z = 17.72, p < 0.0001; both untrustworthy (b = 1.48, SE =
0.23, z = 6.35, p < 0.001) and trustworthy (b = 0.49, SE =
0.08, z = 5.93, p < 0.001) conditions were significantly different
from the neutral condition. In addition, the difference between
untrustworthy and neutral conditions was significantly different
from the difference between neutral and trustworthy conditions,
b = 0.87, SE = 0.17, t = 5.18, p < 0.001, (Figure 1B); thus, our
trust manipulation had a larger effect on delaying gratification
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Perceived trustworthiness increased as a function of
trust condition. Error bars are standard error. (B) Probability of
delaying gratification was lower in the untrustworthy condition (red)
compared to the neutral (blue) and trustworthy conditions (green),
reflecting reduced willingness to delay gratification with untrustworthy
individuals. (C) Perceived trustworthiness correlates positively with
probability of delay across conditions. Residuals after regressing out
mean probability of delay for each subject is plotted on the y-axis.
Individual data points are jittered 0.2 units on the x-axis for display
purposes.
at lower levels of trust, consistent with prior work showing non-
linear effects of trust manipulations on other behaviors (Fareri
et al., 2012). There was also an interaction between condition
and rank, b = 0.11, SE = 0.02, z = 6.1, p < 0.001, such that
the increase in delayed choices with rank was smaller in the
untrustworthy condition relative to the trustworthy and neu-
tral conditions. This suggests that as the delayed option became
more appealing, those in the untrustworthy condition were more
likely to continue to choose the immediate option. Importantly,
perceived trustworthiness predicted probability of delaying, b =
0.49, SE = 0.03, z = 18.53 p < 0.0001, such that less perceived
trustworthiness predicted lower willingness to delay gratification
(Figure 1C). In addition, there was an interaction between con-
dition and trustworthiness (b = 0.21, SE = 0.03, z = 6.30, p <
0.001), such that trustworthiness predicted probability of delay-
ing within only the untrustworthy condition, consistent with a
non-linear effect of trust on delay of gratification.
These results suggest that reducing social trust, in the absence
of rewards, can decrease willingness to delay gratification.
However, participants read all three vignettes and were asked
to rate trustworthiness (to replicate Delgado et al., 2005) before
making intertemporal choices, raising the possibility that they
realized the study was investigating the role of trust in their
choices, and responded based on their belief that trust should
increase their willingness to delay. The fixed order of the vignettes
also leaves open the possibility that perceived trustworthiness,
willingness to delay, and their relationship were somehow driven
by the order of vignettes. Experiment 2 addresses these issues
by manipulating social trust between participants, and tests the
replicability of the effects of social trust in the absence of rewards
on delaying gratification.
EXPERIMENT 2
All details were identical to Experiment 1 except where
noted. Participants were randomly assigned to trustworthy,
untrustworthy, or neutral conditions, rather than reading all
three vignettes, and personality ratings were moved to the end of
the survey, to minimize demand characteristics. To enhance the
manipulation of social trust, each vignette was accompanied by a
trustworthy, untrustworthy, or neutral computer-generated face.
These faces were drawn from a larger database of faces manipu-
lated to vary in trustworthiness (Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008)
and known to influence trusting behavior (e.g., Oosterhof and
Todorov, 2009; Todorov et al., 2009).
The between-subjects design of Experiment 2 allowed us to use
a larger set of intertemporal choice questions, in a procedure sim-
ilar to standard intertemporal choice tasks (Richards et al., 1999;
Ballard and Knutson, 2009), so that we could calculate discount-
ing rates (k-values). A much larger sample of participants was
tested, to yield a more precise estimate of discounting rates and
of the influence of our trust manipulation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred and seventy two participants (65 males, 60 females,
13 who preferred not to indicate gender) between 18 and 61 years
of age (Mage = 28 years, SD = 8.9 years) participated in this
study. Participants were paid $0.25 for completing this study,
which took approximately 10min. This lower pay rate was chosen
given the larger sample size, and because compensation rates on
Mechanical Turk only influence enrollment rate, not quality of the
data (Buhrmester et al., 2011). All participants lived in the United
States, and were normally distributed in terms of socioeconomic
status, with the average participant having completed some col-
lege and receiving a financial income between $37,500–49,999
per year.
To maintain the between subjects design, we only included
data collected on the first visit from any IP address; this resulted
in the exclusion of 34 participants who completed surveys from
more than one condition from the same IP address. All remaining
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participants were included in the analyses; results were iden-
tical when excluding subjects based on null or inconsistent
temporal discounting behavior (as defined as in Johnson and
Bickel, 2008, N = 22), or for completing the survey too quickly
(<3min, N = 3) as has been done in some studies (Lee, 2010;
Bucholz and Latorre, 2011), but did not occur in Experiment 1.
Final analyses included 46 participants in the trustworthy con-
dition, 49 in the untrustworthy condition, and 43 in the neutral
condition.
Materials and procedure
Participants read one vignette, accompanied by a face. Three faces
were selected from a database of 100 white male faces devel-
oped by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) and implemented in
the FaceGen Modeller program (Singular Inversions, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada). Three faces were used to minimize effects of
stimulus-specific variances related to the faces. Three variations—
trustworthy, untrustworthy, and neutral—of each of the three
faces were used, resulting in nine faces total (Figure 2). These
variations differed in terms of characteristics that had been deter-
mined to be optimal in representing trustworthiness, based on
principle component analysis of 300 emotionally neutral comput-
erized faces that had been rated on a variety of social dimensions
(Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008). For example, increasing the dis-
tance between the eyes and the eyebrows was associated with
ratings of increased trustworthiness. Face images were 400× 477
pixels in size.
Participants then completed the intertemporal choice task,
which consisted of 49 binary choice questions between a smaller
immediate reward ($5) and a larger delayed reward that varied in
delay (4–150 days) and value ($11–34). The face from the vignette
appeared three times across the intertemporal choice questions,
to reinforce the character that the questions pertained to. Lastly,
participants completed the personality ratings. Three participants
had some missing rating scores and were excluded from rating
analyses.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Trust manipulated in the absence of reward, between subjects,
influenced participants’ willingness to delay gratification, with
perceived trustworthiness again predicting willingness to delay.
FIGURE 2 | Faces were paired with vignettes in Experiment 2, matching
the condition to enhance the manipulation of trust. Faces varied in
trustworthiness from untrustworthy (left), neutral (middle), to trustworthy
(right). A total of three different faces were used, each with untrustworthy,
neutral, and trustworthy versions, yielding nine different faces overall.
Approach and preliminary analyses
A k parameter was estimated for each participant (as in Ballard
and Knutson, 2009), with lower k-values indicating increased
preference for delayed rewards. Indifference points were calcu-
lated at each delay using logistic regression to determine the later
value at which there was an equal probability of each response.
When estimates were outside of the range of displayed later val-
ues (e.g., participants gave all later or now responses or gave
inconsistent responses), indifference points were assumed to be
just outside the range of values presented (34.5 for all “now” and
10.5 for all “later” responses). Discounted value (DV) was calcu-
lated at each delay (DV= $5/indifference point) and a hyperbolic
discounting function was fit to all DVs using non-linear least
squares: DV = 1/(1 + k × delay), where k is the unknown
discounting parameter. As in previous research, this hyperbolic
model provided a good fit for the data, as assessed using visual
inspection and model comparison with an exponential func-
tion. There were no significant main effects or interactions with
the different versions of trustworthy, untrustworthy, and neutral
faces, so subsequent analyses collapse across faces within each
trust condition. All analyses were completed using linear model
(lm) in the R statistical package. All results were confirmed using
bootstrapping, as k-values are not normally distributed.
Perceived trustworthiness was again predicted by condition
(untrustworthy < neutral < trustworthy), b = 0.85, SE = 0.16,
t(130) = 5.34, p < 0.0001, Cohen’s d = 0.45, suggesting that our
trust manipulation was effective (Figure 3A). The difference
between trustworthy and neutral conditions was not significantly
different from the difference between neutral and untrustworthy
conditions, as evidenced by overlapping 95% confidence intervals
of parameter estimates for trustworthy-neutral (0.32, 1.52) and
neutral-untrustworthy (0.12, 1.38).
Effects of trust on delaying gratification
Findings were largely consistent with Experiment 1. Participants’
preferences for delayed rewards, as indexed by k, was predicted
by condition, b = −0.03, SE = 0.01, t(136) = −3.31, p < 0.005;
participants were less willing to delay gratification in the
untrustworthy condition than in the trustworthy and neutral
conditions, b = 0.02, SE = 0.01, t(136) = −4.13, p < 0.001,
with no difference between trustworthy and neutral conditions,
b = 0.01, SE = 0.02, t(87) = 0.59, p = 0.55 (Figure 3B). The
difference between untrustworthy and neutral conditions was
greater than the difference between neutral and trustworthy
conditions, as evidenced by non-overlapping 95% confidence
intervals of parameter estimates for trustworthy-neutral (0.01,
−0.02) and neutral-untrustworthy (0.03, 0.10); thus, as in
Experiment 1, our trust manipulation had a larger effect on
delaying gratification at lower levels of trust. The same pattern
was observed across a model free, but less precise measure of
delay of gratification: percentage of delayed choices across the
experiment (trustworthy/neutral vs. untrustworthy: b = 0.07,
SE = 0.2, t(133) = 3.83, p < 0.001; trustworthy vs. neutral:
p > 0.3). Finally, perceived trustworthiness predicted k-values
(using non-parametric bootstrapping due to positive skew in
discounting values, 95% CI: −0.001, −0.02, and using paramet-
ric analyses, b = −0.011, SE = 0.005, t(135) = 2.4, p < 0.025),
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Perceived trustworthiness increased as a function of
trust condition. Error bars are standard error. (B) Discounting rates were
higher in the untrustworthy condition (red) compared to the neutral
(blue) and trustworthy conditions (green), reflecting reduced willingness
to delay gratification with untrustworthy individuals. y-axis is reversed
for conceptual consistency. (C) Perceived trustworthiness correlates
positively with discounting rates. Correlation (95% confidence interval of
r: 0.02–0.36) was verified using non-parametric bootstrapping due to
positive skew in discounting values. Individual data points are jittered
0.2 units on the x-axis for display purposes.
such that participants were less willing to delay gratification with
characters perceived to be less trustworthy (Figure 3C).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that willingness to delay gratification
depends on social trust. Whether contemplating a single inter-
action with one individual or multiple interactions with different
individuals, people are less willing to wait for rewards with indi-
viduals they see as less trustworthy, when there is reason to doubt
that an individual would actually deliver the delayed reward in
the future. Directly experiencing the unreliability of an individ-
ual was unnecessary; here, impressions of trustworthiness from
vignettes and faces produced powerful effects. This work comple-
ments prior correlational work, which suggested a link between
trust and delaying gratification but did not establish causality
(Mischel, 1961; Harris and Madden, 2002), and prior experi-
mental work, which suggested that trust could influence delay-
ing gratification but did not manipulate trust independent of
rewards that can influence self-control (Mahrer, 1956; Kidd et al.,
2012). Our studies provide the first experimental manipulation of
trust while avoiding manipulations of reward, and thus critically
demonstrate a causal role for social trust in delaying gratification,
independent of other factors that can influence self-control.
Our findings add to a growing literature emphasizing the role
of social factors in cognitive processes (Sanfey, 2007; Bernier et al.,
2011; Meyer et al., 2012), and indicate the need to revise promi-
nent theories of delay of gratification. Most theories focus on the
role of cognitive control, basic valuation, and prospective mecha-
nisms (Peters and Büchel, 2011). The role of social factors, while
raised early on in this domain (Mischel, 1961), has been largely
overlooked in subsequent theorizing and testing. For example,
social factors go unmentioned in the burgeoning literature on the
neural mechanisms supporting delay of gratification (Wittmann
and Paulus, 2008; Luhmann, 2009; Peters and Büchel, 2011).
However, our results demonstrate that delaying gratification does
not occur in a social vacuum.
Our findings are also relevant to the study of social trust. For
example, while existing studies have focused on the consequences
of trust for immediate processing and behavior (McCabe et al.,
2001; Delgado et al., 2005; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Van den Bos et al.,
2011), the present work demonstrates how a lack of trust may
also negatively impact planning for the future. In addition, in
both experiments, we find non-linear effects of trust manipula-
tions, like those observed in studies testing other effects of trust.
For example, individuals invest less in the Trust Game with part-
ners judged to be untrustworthy, but invest similarly with neutral
and trustworthy partners (Fareri et al., 2012). In our experiments,
participants were less willing to delay gratification with untrust-
worthy partners, and showed less differentiation between neutral
and trustworthy partners. Such findings indicate a “threshold”
for social trust, where decreases in trust below a certain thresh-
old influence behavior more than increases in trust above that
threshold, which seems worthy of further investigation.
Because our studies used trust vignettes and faces and hypo-
thetical choices about whether to delay gratification, future work
should build on these findings to examine the ability to actu-
ally wait for delayed gratification, with real people and rewards.
Hypothetical and real rewards elicit similar patterns of tempo-
ral discounting behavior (Madden et al., 2003) and associated
neural activity (Bickel et al., 2009), but social factors such as
trust may matter more in situations involving an actual person
rather than a vignette, or actual rewards rather than hypothetical
ones. Similarly, hypothetical choices about delaying gratification
and actually delaying gratification are correlated (Johnson and
Bickel, 2002; Duckworth and Kern, 2011), but the influence of
social factors may be more apparent when a hypothetical choice
is first made rather than when a delayed choice must continue to
be abided by (as in traditional delay of gratification paradigms),
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which may require additional processes, such as inhibitory con-
trol. Future studies could address such possibilities by compar-
ing the influences of social trust on delaying gratification with
vignettes vs. an experimenter (e.g., who behaves in a trustwor-
thy or untrustworthy manner), with choices for immediate or
delayed rewards vs. actually waiting for a delayed reward, andwith
hypothetical vs. real rewards (e.g., using primary rewards such as
food, or randomly selecting and honoring one response from the
intertemporal choice task; Reynolds et al., 2003).
Social factors suggest intriguing alternative interpretations of
prior findings on delay of gratification, and suggest new direc-
tions for intervention. For example, the struggles of certain pop-
ulations, such as addicts, criminals, and youth, might reflect their
reduced ability to trust that rewards will be delivered as promised.
Such variations in trust might reflect experience (e.g., children
have little control over whether parents will provide a promised
toy) and predisposition (e.g., with genetic variations predicting
trust; Krueger et al., 2012). Children show little change in their
ability to delay gratification across the 2–5 years age range (Beck
et al., 2011), despite dramatic improvements in self-control, indi-
cating that other factors must be at work. The fact that delay
of gratification at 4-years predicts successful outcomes years or
decades later (Casey et al., 2011; Shoda et al., 1990) might reflect
the importance of delaying gratification in other processes, or the
importance of individual differences in trust from an early age
(e.g., Kidd et al., 2012). From this perspective, emphasizing social
trustworthiness might be important in interventions for delay-
ing gratification, not just for increasing accuracy of information
collected from individuals with deficits (as emphasized for some
interventions, e.g., with juvenile delinquents), but for improving
behavior. Testing such possibilities for the role of social trust, and
investigating how social and other factors interact, may greatly
advance our understanding of the fundamental ability to delay
gratification.
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